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Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction and Section 96: 
An Overdue Evaluation
Criminal law and procedure are unfailing areas for technical argument and 
constitutional challenge. Until recently, however, our criminal court structures 
have escaped scrutiny on the basis of the federal appointment power in section 
96 of the Constitution Act, 1867.1 This has now changed with decisions by 
New Brunswick courts in R. v. Charters and R. v. McGann.2 Commenced as 
separate prosecutions for narcotic offences, they were joined as one matter 
and resolved by quashing the charges on the basis that the accused’s Charter 
right to speedy trial had been infringed.3 En route to this result, four judges 
delivered seven separate judgments of which two considered the section 96 
issue. The Provincial Court judge, having himself raised the issue, determined 
that the Criminal Code scheme of conferring almost complete offence jurisdic­
tion, either absolutely or by consent, on non-section 96 criminal courts 
violated the constitutional constraints imposed by that provision. On judicial 
review to the Court of Queen’s Bench, the lower court ruling was quashed and 
the jurisdiction of the Provincial Court in relation to the particular offences 
charged was affirmed.
In section 96 litigation the focus of inquiry is narrowed to the particular 
functions or powers in issue. As, however, the narcotic charges in Charters 
and McGann were unknown in 1867, placing such offences in the section 96 
context requires examination of criminal jurisdiction at large. Accordingly, 
after reviewing the law of section 96, this note undertakes a general historical 
inquiry into Canadian courts of criminal jurisdiction in order to determine the 
jurisdictional constaints intended by that constitutional provision. The 
jurisdictional scheme of the present Criminal Code is then outlined and the 
reasons for decision in Charters and McGann analyzed, leading to conclusions 
which cast serious doubt on the constitutionality of the present criminal court
‘(U.K.), 30 & 31 Viet., c.3.
2R. V. Charters (1986), 71 N.B.R. (2d) 31 (Prov. Ct.); Re Harper: R. v. McGann & Charters (1986), 70 N.B.R. 
(2d) 361 (Q.B.).
3Canadian Charter o f Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the 
Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c .l l .  The sequence of events leading to the sudden termination of these prosecu­
tions was both colourful and varied. Approximately one week before his scheduled jury trial, Charters re-elected 
trial by provincial court judge. On 26 February Harper Prov. Ct. J. on his own motion refused to accept the re- 
election and held, in oral reasons, that it was ultra vires the Parliament of Canada to confer on an inferior court 
either exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction over “ serious criminal offences” . The next day, 27 February, Charters 
was brought before Dickson J., who took the position that the Queen’s Bench lacked jurisdiction to proceed in 
light of the re-election. He resolved on requesting the chief Provincial Court judge to assign another trial judge to 
Charters’ case. Harrigan, Chief Prov. Ct. J., declined to accede to this request. On 28 February Judge Harper ap­
plied his reasoning to halt the trial of McGann, which had proceeded to the stage of the opening of the defence. 
On 7 March Judge Harper released lengthy reasons for decision in Charters. On 10 April Stevenson J. denied 
leave to Judge Harper to appear and argue the jurisdictional issue on the scheduled judicial review application. 
On 8 May Stevenson J., having heard argument three days earlier, delivered reasons granting judicial review, 
quashing the decisions of Judge Harper and directing him to proceed with both cases. On 6 June Stratton 
C.J.N.B. denied an application brought by Judge Harper for a stay of the judicial review orders of Stevenson J. 
On 24 June Dickson J. granted an application under s.24 of the Charter and terminated the prosecutions.
(1987), 36 UNB LJ 87.
system. A detailed appendix reviews criminal court structure and jurisdiction 
in each of the four original provinces prior to Confederation.
Section 96
Every written constitution of necessity contains both institutional provisions, 
establishing the various organs of government, and distribution of powers pro­
visions, which feed jurisdiction to those institutions. In the Canadian context 
this was early recognized in Valin v. Langlois. In confirming the validity of the 
conferral by Parliament on the provincial superior courts of jurisdiction in 
relation to controverted elections, Ritchie C.J. observed that:
[B]efore these specific powers of legislation were conferred on Parliament and on 
the Local Legislatures, all matters connected with the constitution of Parliament 
and the Provincial Constitutions had been duly provided for, separate and distinct 
from the distribution of legislative powers, and, of course, over-riding the powers so 
distributed; for until Parliament and the Local Legislatures were duly constituted, 
no legislative powers, if conferred could be exercised.4
This self-evident relationship between the two types of provisions was, 
however, obscured by insertion of a non obstante clause in the preamble to 
section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867 such that the legislative powers of 
Parliament were conferred “ notwithstanding anything in this Act” . Whether 
this clause reversed the normal hierarchy of institutional and distribution of 
powers provisions was an issue long avoided by restrictive construction of the 
enumerated federal powers. For example, in the 1979 Senate Reference the 
Supreme Court “ read down” the phrase “ Constitution of Canada” in the 
then section 91(1) so as not to refer to Canada in a geographic sense but rather 
to “ matters of interest only to the federal government” .5 Accordingly, it was 
not open to Parliament unilaterally to amend the institutional provisions of 
the constitution relating to the “ Senate” . The issue whether institutional or 
federal distribution of powers provisions were to be controlling was only 
recently resolved by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Reference Re Ex­
ported Natural Gas Tax. The referred facts set squarely in opposition federal 
legislative jurisdiction under section 91(3) (“ The raising of money by any 
mode or System of Taxation” ) and the institutional provision in Part VII of 
the Constitution Act, 1867 conferring inter jurisdictional immunity from taxa­
tion (section 125: “ No Lands or Property belonging to Canada or any Pro­
vince shall be liable to Taxation” ). The decision of the majority expressly held 
in favour of the institutional provision:
The immunity conferred by s. 125 must override the express powers of taxation con­
tained in ss.91(3) and 92(2). The legislative powers conferred by Part VI (ss. 91 to 
95) must be regarded as qualified by provisions elsewhere in the Act.4
One of the provisions “ elsewhere in the Act” which enjoys the status of 
an institutional provision is section 96: “ The Governor General shall appoint 
the judges of the Superior, District and County Courts in each Province...” .
4(1879), 3 S.C.R. 1 at 11.
5 Reference: Re Authority o f Parliament in Relation to the Upper House [Senate Reference], [1980] 1 S.C.R. 54;
(1979), 30 N.R. 271 at 285.
The intent of this section was, at least in part, a practical one. On the assump­
tion that the “ brightest and the best” of the public-spirited legal minds would 
choose the federal political arena over the provincial, it naturally followed that 
their talents would be best measured, and a proper selection for the more im­
portant judicial appointments made, by the federal authorities.7 However 
cynically one may view this rationalization in relation to other factors such as 
recognition of the importance of the judiciary in promoting the legitimacy of 
the new state and its laws and the significant though mundane control of 
patronage, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council soon beatified the sec­
tion as one of the “ principal pillars in the temple of justice, and...not to be 
undermined” .8 They viewed section 96 as a key element promoting the impar­
tiality and independence of the provincial judiciary.9 The reasoning behind 
this view was not articulated, but it was presumably felt that federally- 
appointed judges would be free of any obligation or deference to the provin­
cial authorities. Why such judges would feel equally independent of federal 
authorities is not apparent and remains a serious flaw in this theory.
Section 96 draws an arbitrary line across the judicial institutions of the 
provinces. Above the line, the power of appointment is exclusively federal; 
below the line, appointment may be made provincially under heads 92(2) and 
(14) of the Constitution Act, 1867. Above the line are a generic court — the 
Superior Court — and two particularly named courts, the District and County 
Courts. It has always been accepted that section 96 could not be avoided by a 
mere change in the nomenclature of courts. The identity of section 96 courts 
rests on the powers and functions of such court in 1867 rather than on the 
name under which they function. In Re Residential Tenancies Act, 1979, the 
Supreme Court of Canada, per Dickson J., synthesized the jurisprudence into 
a three-step test for a violation of section 96.10 Given a particular power or 
jurisidiction in issue, the first step is to determine by thorough historical in­
quiry whether, if it existed in 1867, it was within the exclusive power or 
jurisdiction of superior, district or county courts or, if it did not then exist, 
whether the power or jurisdiction broadly conforms to such exclusive power or 
jurisdiction. If the answer to this inquiry is in the negative, that is the end of 
the matter, as the power or jurisdiction may be validly exercised by a body 
other than a section 96 court. If, however, the answer to the historical enquiry 
is in the affirmative, the second step asks whether the particular function re­
tains its nature as ‘judicial function’ as exercised in its institutional setting. Im­
portant considerations are whether there is a lis inter partes and whether the
7Per Hector Langevin, Solicitor-General, during the Confederatio debates in the Parliament of Canada, 1865, 
quoted in E.R.A. Edwards, “ Section 96: The Historical Rationale” (1984) 42 Advocate 541 at 542.
*Toronto Corporation v. York Corporation (1938), [1938] A.C. 415 at 426.
9Martineau & Sons v. Montreal, [1932] A.C. 113 at 120-21. P. Hogg, Constitutional Law o f Canada, 2nd ed.
(Carswell: Toronto, 1985) at 136 suggests that the rationale for section %  is that “ provincial courts are courts of 
general jurisdiction” applying and determining the constitutional validity of both federal and provincial laws. 
Accordingly, in his view, “ some federal involvement in their establishment is appropriate” . While attractive, this 
view equates section 96 courts with provincial superior courts as courts of general jurisdiction and ignores the in­
clusion of District and County Courts in section 96. Second, this is merely a rationalization unsupported by the 
considerations actually expressed at the time. Third, this view logically supports provincial involvement in the 
selection of Supreme and Federal Court judges who must, like their provincial colleagues, interpret and apply the 
constitution.
tribunal acts in a ‘judicial capacity’ — does it apply “ a recognized body of 
rules in a manner consistent with fairness and impartiality” ? If the answer is in 
the negative, as when the tribunal’s task involves questions of ‘policy’ as op­
posed to ‘principle’, then again, that ends the matter and the power or jurisdic­
tion may be exercised by a body other than a section 96 court. If, however, the 
answer to this second inquiry is also in the affirmative, the third step calls for a 
determination whether the tribunal’s adjudicative function is merely ancillary 
to its general administrative functions or is its sole or central function. If the 
adjudicative function is the sole or central one, section 96 is violated since the 
tribunal would then be exercising, in a judical capacity, and as its sole or cen­
tral function, a power or jurisdiction exercised in 1867 exclusively by a 
superior, district or county court. In other words, it would be acting ‘like a sec­
tion 96 court’. On the other hand, if the adjudicative function is merely an­
cillary, then the tribunal would not be said to be acting ‘like a section 96 
court’. To fall victim to a section 96 challenge, the power or jurisdiction in 
issue must fail all three steps in the inquiry; it survives if it succeeds at any 
stage. Where the institution in question is an administrative tribunal, the three- 
step approach may be short-circuited by assuming adverse findings at steps 
one and two and concentrating on step three — the relative importance of the 
adjudicative function. Steps two and three lose their significance where the 
tribunal in question is itself a court, as the factors that are important are not 
available. In such a situation the only test is the historical inquiry.
Before applying this test for section 96 to courts of criminal jurisdiction, 
two significant propositions must be noted. First, despite former doubts ex­
pressed, particularly by Chief Justice Laskin, it is now clear that section 96 
binds Parliament, at least to the extent that in the exercise of its legislative 
authority jurisdiction is conferred on provincial courts or tribunals.11 This was 
confirmed by the Court’s 1983 decision in McEvoy v. Attorney-General o f  
New Brunswick, in which section 96 was invoked as a constitutional impedi­
ment to creation of a unified criminal court with provincially-appointed judges 
exercising comprehensive jurisdiction conferred by Parliament.12 Second, as 
recently applied by the Supreme Court, it would appear that there is no 
uniform concept or standard of what constituted a superior, district or county 
court in 1867. Rather, the historical inquiry is controlled by the 1867 position 
of the province concerned, if one of the original four. This follows from the 
Court’s decision in Attorney-General of Quebec and Régie du Logement v. 
Grondin in which issues similar to those previously decided by the Court in Re 
Residential Tenancies Act, 1979 were resolved differently owing to historical 
differences in curial jurisdiction in Quebec from that in Ontario prior to 
1867.13 Accordingly, different results can be achieved for the same power or 
jurisdiction when the issue arises in one of the four original confederating pro­
vinces. This possible checkerboard effect marks section 96 as a unique institu­
tional provision in our constitution: its application may vary according to the 
history of the province concerned. Though one may regret this exception to
1 'Papp v. Papp (1969), [1970] 1 O.R. 331 at 339 (C.A.); Attorney-General o f Canada v. Canard (1975), [1976] 1 
S.C.R. 170 at 176; Reference Re B.C. Family Relations Act (1982), [1982] 1 S.C.R. 62 at 76.
12(1983), [1983] 1 S.C.R. 704; (1983), 148 D.L.R. (3d) 25.
uniformity, the historical inquiry task is thereby simplified to the province 
concerned, since constitutional principles applicable to provincial landlord 
and tenant law apply equally to federal criminal law. On the other hand, this 
variable interpretation is open to question since the actual wording of section 
96 does not necessarily require it. It is also inconsistent with prior section 96 
jurisprudence where a uniform concept was sought and anomalous legislative 
provisions in some provinces isolated and identified.14
Historical Inquiry
Sharing a common English legal heritage, it is not surprising to find that the 
uniting provinces of Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia had, 
in 1867, similar substantive criminal laws and criminal court structures. Public 
law offences were divided on a procedural basis into two types: summary con­
viction and indictable. Summary conviction proceedings, says Blackstone, 
were a pure creation of statute; the person or persons appointed by statute 
determined the guilt or innocence of the accused without the intervention of a 
jury .15 The procedure was initially limited to the most minor offences (e.g., 
swearing, drunkenness and vagrancy) and was instituted to provide speedy 
justice while relieving freeholders from “ troublesome attendances to try every 
minute offence” as jurors. The growth in the use of summary proceedings for 
minor public order offences — or, as Stephen described them, “ administrative 
purpose” offences — into the more serious reaches of the criminal law ob­
viously alarmed Blackstone, who warned of the threat to the “ admirable and 
truly English trial by jury” .16 Indictable offences were in the realm of trial by 
jury. An indictment or allegation of a specific offence was found by a grand 
jury, when that system was used, or an information was put before a justice of 
the peace who conducted an inquiry and then bound the accused over for his 
trial by a petit jury. Although all indictable offences were prosecuted before a 
petit jury, such offences were categorized as either felony or misdemeanor. 
This distinction, no longer in our technical legal parlance, followed a line bet­
ween more and less serious criminal offences and may be said generally to have 
developed due to the consequences of conviction — historically the punish­
ment for felony being death and also perhaps forfeiture of estate.17 In British 
North America in 1867 these felony/misdemeanor and indictable/summary 
conviction distinctions were recognized and applied in the criminal law of each 
of the four confederating colonies.
In each of the provinces court structures on the English hierarchical 
model administered criminal justice. At the foundation of the system were 
justices of the peace — men of good reputation, position and property though 
usually not legally trained. Sitting alone, a justice exercised a limited 
preliminary jurisdiction in relation to indictable offences by, for example, is­
suing warrants, conducting an inquiry, binding the accused and witnesses over
14Reference Re Section 6 o f the Family Relations Act (1982), 131 D.L.R. (3d) 257 at 264, per Laskin C.J.C.
1 sBlackstone‘s Commentaries vol. IV (1769) at 280; see also J. Stephen, History o f the Criminal Law o f England 
(London, 1883) at 122-26.
1‘Stephen, ibid. at 122; Blackstone, ibid. at 278.
17Stephen, ibid. at 192-93; Blackstone, ibid. at 94.
for the trial and, in misdemeanor offences, granting bail. Combinations of 
justices, usually two sitting together, constituted a court of summary jurisdic­
tion to try those offences for which this statutory procedure was allowed. In 
urban areas the office of magistrate was usually constituted exercising the 
authority of two or more justices of the peace, thereby conferring a summary 
jurisdiction.
A further combination of justices of the peace met every four months as 
the Court of Quarter Sessions for a county. The court was constituted by two 
or more justices of the peace, though historically all justices for the county 
were called to attend. Further, certain of the justices were named as being “ of 
the quorum” , so that the attendance of at least one of them was necessary to 
constitute the court. By the commission to the justices, the wording of which 
was settled in 1590, Sessions had jurisdiction to:
hear and  determ ine all felonies, poisonings, enchan tm ents, sorceries, a rts m agic, 
trespasses, forestallings, regratings, engrossings and  exto rtions, and  all o ther crim es 
and  offences o f  which such justices m ay o r ought law fully to  in q u ire .1*
In essence Sessions enjoyed a nominal comprehensive jurisdiction over “ all 
felonies and trespasses” or “ all felonies and indeed all crimes except 
treason” .19 This broad jurisdiction was qualified by an admonition in cases of 
difficulty not to “ proceed to judgment, but in the presence of one of the 
justices of the courts of king’s bench or common pleas, or one of the judges of 
assize” .20 According to Stephen, quoting Chitty, by the early 19th century the 
jurisdiction of Sessions in practice was limited to “ petty larcenies and misde­
meanours” .21 Whatever the practice, the theoretically broad jurisdiction of 
Sessions continued into the early 19th century with the upper limit of its 
jurisdiction conventionally fixed at offences short of the death penalty.22 In 
addition to Quarter Sessions, incorporated urban areas had a variant of Ses­
sions with the same jurisdiction as in the counties but not limited to the four 
sittings per year. As well, special Sessions could be constituted if the need 
arose.
The more serious indictable offences were normally reserved for the com­
missioners of Oyer and Terminer and Gaol Delivery, usually sitting as Courts 
of Assize, though the commissions could be issued independently of any civil 
jurisdiction. The commission of Oyer and Terminer authorized the holder “ to 
hear and determine all treasons, felonies and misdemeanors” in general, while 
the commission of Gaol Delivery was directed to the trial of prisoners in a par­
ticular gaol. Although the commissions could be issued to anyone, they were in 
practice issued to the judges of the common law courts for trial of the most 
serious indictable offences on circuit. Finally, at the apex of the criminal trial
1'Stephen, ibid. at 111-16; Blackstone, ibid. at 268.
1’Stephen, ibid. at 114; Blackstone, ibid. at 268.
20BIackstone, ibid. at 268.
21 History o f the Criminal Law, supra, note 15 at 114-15; see also J. Chitty, Practical Treatise on the Criminal 
Law, vol. I (Philadelphia, 1819) at 114.
22R.M. Jackson, The Machinery o f Justice in England, 7th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977) 
at 182.
court structure was the Court of King’s Bench which, as one of the central 
common law courts, enjoyed in theory an unlimited criminal jurisdiction over 
all manner of crimes.23 In this English model, trial by jury — that is, for 
felonies and misdemeanors by indictable procedures — was the method of ad­
judication in Courts of Quarter Sessions, Oyer and Terminer and Gaol 
Delivery and King’s Bench.
Into this English model it is now necessary to fit the control standard of 
section 96 in order to determine where it divides the hierarchy of criminal 
courts in section 96 and non-section 96 courts. This section, it will be recalled, 
established a line at the “ Superior, District and County Courts” level for ex­
clusive federal appointment. Just as there can be no doubt that the summary 
jurisdiction courts of justices of the peace were outside the ambit of the section 
in 1867, so superior courts of criminal jurisdiction (whether labelled Supreme 
Court as in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia or Queen’s Bench as in Ontario 
and Quebec) were within the section, being generically enumerated therein. It 
is also clear that courts of Oyer and Terminer and Gaol Delivery were section 
96 courts.24 While historically the commissions were not restricted to the 
judges of the superior courts, only in Ontario was there legislation in 1867 
allowing issuance of commissions to county court judges and “ counsel learned 
in the law” .25 In New Brunswick the judge of the Supreme Court had been 
freed of the inclusion in the commissions of magistrates and others by 
legislative enactment in 1854.26 It must not be forgotten that in England com­
missions of Oyer and Terminer and Gaol Delivery were issued to judges of the 
superior courts together with other persons, usually justices or magistrates, 
but it was specified that the judges were only “ of the quorum, so that the rest 
cannot act without them” .27 The close association of the commissions with the 
English Queen’s Bench was fully realized when in 1873 the Courts of Oyer and 
Terminer and Gaol Delivery were formally made part of the High Court of 
Justice.28 This reform was also adopted in the provinces of Canada.
The pivotal point in this inquiry has now been reached — determining on 
which side of the section 96 line to place the Courts of Quarter Sessions of the 
Peace. This question is not as free from doubt as the placing of the other 
criminal courts in the hierarchy. Each of the four confederating provinces had 
criminal courts based on the Quarter Sessions model prior to 1867, but varia­
23 Blacks tone’s Commentaries, vol. IV (1769) at 262, 267, 269; History o f the Criminal Law, supra, note 15 at 
94-95, 107, 110.
24Stephen, ibid. at 111; In Re Robert Evan Sproule (1886), 12 S.C.R. 140 per Ritchie C.J.: “ As to the courts of 
assize, nisi prius, oyer and terminer and general gaol delivery, I am of opinion that these courts are superior 
courts o f record, and...courts of very high degree, dignity and importance” ; Fourth Report o f Commissioners on 
Criminal Law, [1834-41] British Parliamentary Papers.
11 An Act Respecting Courts o f Oyer and Terminer and General Gaol Delivery and o f Assize and Nisi Prius, 
C.S.U.C. 1859, c . l l ,  s.2.
26An Act to regulate the Circuit Courts and Courts o f Oyer and Terminer and Sittings After Term, S.N.B. 1854, 
c. 19, s. 1; J.W. Lawrence, Judges o f New Brunswick and Their Times (Saint John, 1907) at 387 explains this
legislation as resulting from an incident at the Saint John circuit in 1853 when two magistrates overruled the sit­
ting Supreme Court judge.
21 Blackstone’s Commentaries, vol. IV (1769) at 267.
2%Supreme Court o f  Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Viet., c.66, s. 16.
tions among the provinces existed both as to composition and jurisdiction of 
the courts. In Ontario, while justices of the peace were still required in 1867 to 
gather quarterly to constitute a Court of Session in each county, the position 
of Chairman of Sessions was by statute reserved for the judges of the County 
Court, the court consisting of the County Court judge and the justices of the 
peace.29 In addition, Recorder’s Courts with the same formal jurisdiction as 
Sessions were established in municipalities, presided over by a barrister of five 
years’ standing at the Bar or, in this absence, the mayor either sitting alone or 
assisted by aldermen.30 A similar structure existed in Quebec. General Sessions 
of the Peace were held in the Districts of Montreal and Quebec, and Quarter 
Sessions in the other districts of the province on the issuance of a proclamation 
to that effect by the governor, the major criminal work being performed in 
these other districts by the Court of Queen’s Bench.31 Means to constitute Ses­
sions were provided by statute: (i) two justices of the peace at General Ses­
sions; (ii) a judge of the Superior Court sitting alone at Quarter Sessions, ex­
cept for Montreal and Quebec; and (iii) in Montreal and Quebec, the Recorder 
or the Inspector and Superintendant of Police sitting alone at Quarter Ses­
sions.32 In New Brunswick prior to 1867 the English model prevailed in having 
the justices of the peace in the counties — and, in the city and county of Saint 
John the mayor, recorder and alderman — constitute Courts of Sessions for 
the trial of misdemeanors. In 1867 legislation creating the new county court 
system abolished the indictable offence jurisdiction of Sessions, so that at 
union New Brunswick was without such a separate court; it had been replaced 
by the new federally-salaried County Court.33 The greater territorial part of 
Nova Scotia also entered Confederation without a Court of Sessions exercising 
indictable offence jurisdiction. In 1841 the Legislature responded to the 
duplication of criminal jurisdiction in the Supreme Court and Sessions by 
abolishing Sessions as an indictable offence court for all counties in the pro­
vince except Halifax.34 There, Sessions continued on the English model, con­
stituted by justices of the peace.
Jurisdiction of Sessions in relation to specific offences varied among the 
confederating provinces. Again, the English lead in reforming the jurisdiction 
of Sessions was generally followed, with local variation. It will be recalled that 
the historical criminal jurisdiction of Sessions was very broadly framed to in­
clude all indictable offences involving a breach of the peace, treason excepted. 
Although it would appear that in the 16th century Sessions actually exercised 
its jurisdiction over high offences and condemned various accused to death, by 
the late 18th century Sessions, in recognition of the limited expertise of the 
justices, had been curtailed in the actual exercise of its jurisdiction in relation
19An Act Relating to the Court o f General Quarter Sessions o f the Peace, C.S.U.C. 1859, c.17, ss 3,5.
10An Act Respecting the Municipal Institutions o f Upper Canada, C.S.U.C. 1859, c.54, ss 370-71.
31 An Act Respecting the Courts o f General or Quarter Sessions o f the Peace, Justices o f the Peace and Special 
Sessions o f the Peace, C.S.L.C. 1860, c.97, ss 1,2.
32Ibid. ss 4,5.
}iAn Act to Establish County Courts, S.N.B. 1867, c.10.
u An Act to Improve the Administration o f the Law, and to reduce the number o f Courts o f Justice within this 
Province, and to diminish the expense o f the Judiciary therein, S.N.S. 1841, c.3.
to offences punishable by death.35 This decline of Sessions resulted in an in­
creased burden on Assizes and delays in bringing accused to trial, as Assizes 
usually sat only twice a year. Consequently in 1842, Lord Lyndhurst L.C. in­
troduced a bill in Parliament “ to transfer the trial of many offences that were 
not of a capital description from the Assizes to the court of quarter 
sessions” .36 Rather than being expressed in the positive, by stating what the 
jurisdiction of Sessions was, the Act to Define the Jurisdiction o f Justices in 
General and Quarter Sessions o f the Peace was expressed in the negative, 
stating what its jurisdiction was not:
neither the Justices of the Peace acting in and for any County, Riding, Division, or 
Liberty, nor the Recorder of any Borough, shall, at any Session of the Peace, or at 
any Adjournment thereof, try any Person or Persons for any Treason, Murder, or 
Capital Felony, or for any Felony which, when committed by a Person not previous­
ly convicted of Felony, is punishable by Transportation beyond the seas for Life, or 
for any of the following Offences... [there then follow eighteen categories of of­
fences].37
Significantly, rather than restricting Sessions, the Act was intended to enlarge 
its actual jurisdiction by curtailing its formal jurisdiction.
In Nova Scotia this reform was not followed, having been made redun­
dant by the 1841 abolition of the indictable offence jurisdiction of Sessions 
throughout the province except for Halifax County, where Sessions exercised a 
limited actual as opposed to formal jurisdiction. In New Brunswick, the 
Assembly enacted a broader limit on the jurisdiction of Sessions by directing 
that “ Every crime of felony, incest, or adultery, shall be dealt with in the 
Courts of Oyer and Terminer or General Gaol Delivery...” .38 Sessions was 
thereby restricted to the misdemeanor indictable offences. Other provisions 
expressly conferred jurisdiction over lotteries (concurrent with Oyer and Ter­
miner) and “ larceny, accessories thereto, and all receivers of stolen goods 
when the value of the property does not exceed five pounds” .39 In the then 
province of Canada (Ontario and Quebec) reform of the jurisdiction of Ses­
sions came more slowly. The 1859 Consolidated Statutes merely prohibited 
Sessions from trying a miscellany of nine misdemeanor and six felony of­
35History o f the Criminal Law, supra, note 15 at 114-15. See also N. Landau, The Justices o f  the Peace, 
1679-1760 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984) at 241-44 (a study of the Kent justices). There would 
appear to have been a reversal of the decline of Sessions in the early 19th century, at least in some parts of 
England. The commissioners to study the criminal law, supra, note 24 at xi-xii, wrote of the problem of non- 
legally-trained justices and “ the increased extent to which the criminal business of the country is now transacted 
in the Courts of Sessions. Those courts which in former times seldom exercised jurisdiction as to higher offences 
than petit larceny, are now in the habit of trying nearly every species of offence, including even cases where the 
court has no discretion as to the punishment, but is bound on conviction to pass sentence of transportation for 
life” . But see “ Return of General Sessions of the Peace for the County of Devon” (25 Feb. 1834) in [1834], 47 
Sessional Papers, document 143 where of sixty-five charges, there were fifty-two thefts, eight receiving stolen 
goods, four false pretences and one breaking prison.
3*63 H.L. Deb., 30 May 1842, col. 974.
37(U.K.), 1842, 5 & 6 Viet., c.38.
3* O f Proceedings on Indictment, R.S.N.B. 1854-55, c. 158, s.3. See An Act for Improving the Administration o f  
Justice in Criminal Cases, S.N.B. 1831, c.14, s.8.
39O f Proceedings on Indictment, R.S.N.B. 1854-55, c.158, s.22; O f Trial, R.S.N.B. 1854-55, c.159, s.25.
fences.40 In 1861, however, a limited English-model reform was finally enacted 
restricting Sessions from trying “ Treasons and Felonies, for conviction 
whereof the punishment of Death is imposed” .41 At that time ten categories of 
offences were subject to the death penalty, ranging from murder to buggery to 
endangering a vessel. In 1865 the number of such offences was reduced by the 
substitution of a maximum penalty of life imprisonment in seven of the 
categories, leaving only murder, rape and carnal abuse of girls under the age of 
ten as death penalty offences.42
These Courts of Sessions in the four original provinces are not expressly 
enumerated in section 96. That, however, can be a neutral rather than deter­
minative factor. Just as the phrase “ superior courts” has been accepted as a 
generic term, so might “ county court” be considered to refer not only to the 
nominate County Courts with their civil jurisdiction but also to the gathering 
of justices in county Sessions to dispense criminal justice. Some support for 
this view may be found in the transfer in New Brunswick of Sessions’ remain­
ing indictable offence jurisdiction to the new County Court system established 
in anticipation of the coming into force of the Constitution Act, 1867. 
Negating this conclusion is the logical corollary that inclusion of Sessions in 
section 96 would require that justices of the peace be appointed by the 
Governor-General. Such a proposition is not supportable, denied by the very 
structure of section 96 in naming only certain courts, and not all.
Thus the real problem in locating Sessions for section 96 purposes, and in 
assuming a uniform historical standard rather than multiple provincial stan­
dards, is that there was in 1867 no single constitution of a Court of Sessions. In 
England, Sessions was constituted either by the justices of the peace in county 
Sessions or by a Recorder sitting alone in borough or municipal Sessions. In 
Nova Scotia, justices of the peace in Sessions had no indictable offence 
jurisdiction after 1841, except in Halifax County where the jurisdiction seems 
to have been more formal than actual. In New Brunswick, justices in Sessions 
had indictable jurisdiction over only misdemeanors prior to Confederation, 
and even that was removed to the County Courts in anticipation of the union. 
In Ontario, justices in Sessions exercised indictable jurisdiction, but with a 
County Court judge presiding. Only in Quebec did justices in Sessions have 
what would be considered the regular jurisdiction of Sessions, but the exercise 
of that jurisdiction appears to have been secondary to that of the superior 
courts of criminal jurisdiction. Considered globally, Sessions seems more pro­
perly paced within section 96 than without. Yet, one must also consider the 
Sessions constituted in municipalities by the legally-trained Recorder sitting 
alone. Following the English example of London being considered like a
*°An Act respecting Offences against Person and Property, C.S.C. 1859, c.92, ss 51-66; An Act respecting Of­
fences against the Person, C.S.C. 1859, c.91, ss 15, 16, 18 per s.47; An Act respecting Arson and other malicious 
injury to property, C.S.C. 1859, c.93, ss 2,3, 11, 13 per s.39.
4 ̂ An Act to Abolish the Right o f Courts o f Quarter Sessions and Recorders’ Courts to try Treason and Capital 
Felonies, S.C. 1861, c.14, s.l.
42An Act respecting Offences Against the Person, C.S.C. 1859, c.91, ss 5, 19,20,22; An Act respecting Offences 
Against Person and Property, C.S.C. 1859, c.92, ss 1,8; An Act respecting Arson and other malicious injury to 
property, C.S.C. 1859, c.93, ss 7, 8; An Act for abolishing the punishment o f death in certain cases, S.C. 1865, 
c.13, s.l.
separate county, one might argue that Recorder’s Courts are caught by a 
generic interpretation of “ County Courts” in section 96. However, such a 
generic interpretation has already been considered and rejected. As well, 
Recorders are not among the courts expressly enumerated in section 96, 
although that is not determinative as such courts might be said to have been 
continued by section 129 which, in part, continues all courts of criminal 
jurisdiction until altered by Parliament or the legislatures. The weakness of in­
voking section 129 is the introductory qualification “ Except as otherwise pro­
vided by this Act” , which would require compliance with section 96 itself in 
appointment of recorders (assuming Sessions is a section 96 court). This would 
mean that Recorders, as provincial appointees, would have been acting in 
violation of constitutional limitations since 1867.
One means of unlocking the constitutional definition of Sessions may lie 
in a direct application of section 96 to the various combinations available to 
constitute the court. A Sessions of justices of the peace may then be 
distinguished from Sessions with a clear section 96 control, as in Ontario 
where County Court judges presided. Powers and jurisdiction exercised by 
justices alone in Sessions are thereby excluded from the ambit of section 96 
while those reserved to Sessions with a section 96 control, or to the superior 
courts, are within section 96. This solution means a broad spectrum of powers 
and jurisdiction over indictable offences may be conferred validly on non­
section 96 courts, including jury trials. It is consistent with the formal position 
of English and Canadian Sessions, subject to the statutory limits of jurisdic­
tion imposed prior to Confederation. The historical roots of present Provin­
cial Court judges as having only the summary jurisdiction of two or more 
justices of the peace is irrelevant for section 96 purposes. The standard is that 
of the section 96 courts, not of the non-section 96 courts; the powers and 
jurisdiction of non-section 96 courts can expand as long as the section 96 con­
trol is not violated. The problem with this solution is that justices alone did not 
sit in Ontario, could do so in Quebec, had only indictable misdemeanor 
jurisdiction in New Brunswick (until just prior to the Constitution Act, 1867, 
when even that was taken away), and in Nova Scotia, sat only in Halifax 
County with a limited jurisdiction in practice. The viable court was the 
Recorder’s Courts in both Ontario and Quebec. It is this court which effective­
ly resolves the point and makes unnecessary the rationalization of Sessions on 
the basis of its composition. In terms of offence jurisdiction, Recorders were 
equivalent to Sessions presided over by a section 96 judge. The following 
jurisdictional provision of the first Criminal Code and its post-Union 
antecedents confirms this legal equivalency, though restricted to Recorders in 
Montreal and Quebec City:
Every Court of General Quarter Sessions of the Peace, when presided over by a 
Superior Court judge, or a County or District Court judge, or in the cities of Mon­
treal and Quebec by a recorder or judge of the Sessions of the Peace; and in the pro­
vince of New Brunswick every County Court judge has power to try any indictable 
offence except as hereinafter provided.41
43Criminal Code, S.C. 1892, c.29, s.539. The judge of Sessions of the Peace referred to in the section was the title 
of the Inspector and Superintendent of Police after 1862. The antecedent of s. 539 is An Act respecting Pro­
cedure in Criminal Cases, and other matters relating to Criminal Law, S.C. 1869, c.29, s. 12. It may be presumed 
from the absence of Ontario Recorders in the Code provision that they had not exercised their extensive criminal 
jurisdiction in practice.
As a practical result, Sessons is to be considered a non-section 96 court for 
constitutional purposes and the task will be merely to determine those indic­
table offences excluded from the 1867 jurisdiction of Sessions and Recorders 
in Ontario and Quebec. These offences were noted above.44 The early legisla­
tion of the Parliment of Canada was essentially a re-enactment of the legisla­
tion of the former province of Canada, so it is not surprising that these offence 
restrictions are repeated in post-Union criminal law.43 The first Criminal Code 
added to the statutory exclusions those offences historically excluded from 
Sessions such as treason and piracy.46
If, however, the controlling principle is not section 96 uniformity but 
rather the Grondin principle of provincial diversity, the constitutional position 
in both New Brunswick and Nova Scotia will be a more restricted one.47 In 
those provinces, it will be recalled, indictable offence jurisdiction was, on the 
coming into force of the Constitutional Act, 1867, conferred exclusively on 
section 96 courts, the only non-section 96 criminal courts being justices of the 
peace and magistrates exercising a summary jurisdiction. This black and white 
situation is, however, blurred by the existence of Sessions in Halifax County 
and the fact that the indictable misdemeanor jurisidiction of New Brunswick 
Sessions was transferred to the County Court only in 1867.
44Supra, text at notes 40-42.
4iCriminal Procedure Act, R.S.C. 1886, c. 174, ss 4, 5, 6.
“ Criminal Code, S.C. 1892, c.29, s.540:
540. No such court as mentioned in the next preceding section has power to try any offence 
under the following sections, that is to say:
Part IV. Sections sixty-five, treason; sixty-seven, accessories after the fact to treason; sixty- 
eight, sixty-nine and seventy, treasonable offences; seventy-one, assault on the Queen; seventy- 
two, inciting to mutiny; seventy-seven, unlawfully obtaining and communicating official infor­
mation; seventy-eight, communicating information acquired by holding office.
Part VII. Sections one hundred and twenty, administering, taking or procuring the taking of 
oaths to commit certain crimes; one hundred and twenty-one, administering, taking or procuring 
the taking of other unlawful oaths; one hundred and twenty-four, seditious offences; one hun­
dred and twenty-five, libels on foreign sovereigns; one hundred and twenty-six, spreading false 
news.
Part VII. Piracy; any of the sections in this part.
Part IX. Sections one hundred and thirty-one, judicial corruption; one hundred and thirty- 
two, corruption of officiers employed in prosecuting offences; one hundred and thirty-three, 
frauds upon the Government; one hundred and thirty-five, breach of trust by a public officer; 
one hundred and thirty-six, corrupt practices in municipal affairs; one hundred and thirty-seven 
(a.), selling and purchasing offices.
Part XI. Escapes and rescues; any of the sections in this part.
Part XVIII. Sections two hundred and thirty-one, murder; two hundred and thirty-two, at­
tempts to murder; two hundred and thirty-three, threats to murder; two hundred and thirty-four, 
conspiracy to murder; two hundred and thirty-five, accessory after the fact to murder.
Part XXI. Sections two hundred and sixty-seven, rape; two hundred and sixty-eight, attempt to 
commit rape.
Part XXIII. Defamatory libel; any of the sections in this part.
Part XXXIX. Section five hundred and twenty, combinations in restraint of trade.
Part XL. Conspiring or attempting to commit, or being accessory after the fact to any of the 
foregoing offences.
Present Jurisdictional Framework
Simply put, the present Criminal Code recognizes two levels of court for the 
trial of indictable offences: “ superior courts of criminal jurisdiction” and 
“ courts of criminal jurisdiction” . For each province the Supreme Court, (and 
for some the Court of Appeal also) is defined as a “ superior court of criminal 
jurisdiction” and given “ jurisdiction to try any indictable offence” . The 
definition of “ court of criminal jurisdiction” :
(a) a court of general or quarter sessions of the peace, when presided over by a 
superior court judge or a county or district court judge, or in the cities of Mon­
treal and Quebec, by a municipal judge of the city, as the case may be, or a 
judge of the sessions of the peace,
(b) a provincial court judge or judge acting under Part XVI, and
(c) repealed
(d) in the Province of Ontario, the District Court.4'
Subsection (a) repeats the equivalency of the then Recorder’s Courts of Mon­
treal and Quebec with Sessions presided over by a section 96 judge, as found in 
both pre- and early post-Union criminal legislation. Subsection (c) incor­
porates by reference two other definitions, that of “ provincial court judge” in 
section 2 (meaning a person with “ the power and authority of two or more 
justices of the peace” ) and that of “ judge” in section 482 (defined as a section 
96 judge for all provinces except Quebec), where it means “ a judge of the ses­
sions of the peace or a judge of the provincial court” ). Subsection (d) refers to 
a section 96 judge. A distinction is plainly drawn between subsections (a) and 
(d), which are always “ courts of criminal jurisdiction” , and (b), which in­
cludes the Part XVI qualification. Part XVI of the Code provides for trial of 
indictable offences without a jury. Under this Part, a provincial court judge 
has absolute jurisdiction over the offences enumerated in section 483 and, with 
the consent of the accused, jurisdiction by section 484 over all other indictable 
offences except those reserved for “ superior courts of criminal jurisdiction” 
by section 427. Similarly, an accused may elect to be tried by a “judge” as 
defined, sitting without a jury.49 The scheme of Part XVI is reinforced by sec­
tion 427, which expressly confers jurisdiction to try every indictable offence on 
a “ court of criminal jurisdiction” except the crimes of (i) treason, (ii) alarming 
Her Majesty, (iii) intimidating Parliament or a legislature, (iv) inciting to 
mutiny, (v) seditious offences, (vi) piracy, (vii) piratical acts, (viii) murder, (ix) 
being an accessory after the fact to high treason, treason or murder, (x) bribery 
(by the holder of a judicial office) (xi) attempting any of the first seven of­
fences, and (xii) conspiring to commit any of the first eight offences.
Reasons for Decision in Charters and McGann
The initial decision on jurisdiction was delivered by Harper, Prov. Ct. J .50 In 
his lengthy reasons for decision traditional section 96 analyses of the type 
presented above was avoided in favour of what was considered the controlling
41Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, as amended, ss 2, 426.
49fbid. s. 488.
,0Supra, note 2.
decision of the Supreme Court in McEvoy v. Attorney-General o f New 
Brunswick.S1 In that case a proposed unified criminal court with provincially- 
appointed judges exercising complete original criminal jurisdiction, either ex­
clusively or concurrently with the superior court, was held to violate section 
96. It was said that Parliament was bound by the terms of section 96 in respect 
of provincial courts and could not confer complete superior court criminal 
jurisdiction on provincially-appointed judges; nor could a province appoint 
judges to exercise such superior court jurisdiction. Harper Prov. Ct. J. having 
set forth the jurisdictional framework of the Criminal Code, found that the 
proposed court rejected in McEvoy was already in existence as the Provincial 
Court under the Code. He made this determination on the basis that the of­
fences restricted to superior courts of criminal jurisdiction by section 427 were 
of such rarity as to be reduced in practice to murder and conspiracy to murder. 
As a result, a Provincial Court enjoyed Code jurisdiction over all summary 
conviction offences, and all indictable offences except murder and its con­
spiracy either absolutely under section 483 or by consent of the accused under 
section 484. The murder exception was found to be not of such significance as 
to distinguish the Code scheme from the proposal raised in McEvoy.
McEvoy, however, is not so controlling. In McEvoy the Supreme Court 
was addressing specific questions referred by the Lieutenant-Governor in 
Council of New Brunswick. Those questions involved a complete conferral of 
criminal jurisdiction on a provincially-appointed court, and the response of 
the Court must be considered in that light. As the Court itself carefully em­
phasized,
What is being contemplated here is not one or a few transfers of criminal law power, 
such as has already been accomplished under the Criminal Code, but a complete 
obliteration.32
The Court distinguished the notion of an erosion of superior court jurisdiction 
from “ an obliteration” . On the other hand, the passage should not be taken as 
sanctioning past erosions unless the Court is willing to apply a “ living tree” 
approach to section 96, a notion somewhat contrary to strict historical inquiry. 
In any event, such erosions were not before the Court for consideration. The 
significance of McEvoy is that Parliament is bound by section 96; it does not 
establish just where the section 96 line transects criminal law jurisdiction. Only 
one passage in the judgment seems to address this point:
There is no doubt that jurisdiction to try indictable offences was part of the superior 
court’s jurisdiction in 1867; none of the parties suggests otherwise. Nor does anyone 
argue that inferior courts had concurrent jurisdiction to try indictable offences in 
1867.53
The line is apparently being drawn at the indictable/summary offence distinc­
tion. Yet considered in light of the “ obliteration” nature of the proposal, this 
passage should be considered as a neutral statement of the position of the par­
ties rather than a determination by the Court.
51 Supra, note 12.
S2Ibid. D.L.R. at 37.
siIbid., at 36.
Judge Harper summarized his underlying concern in relation to the pre­
sent Code scheme as follows:
Surely at the time of the original enactment of s. 96...it was never contemplated that 
a mere magistrate or a person with the power of two or mofe justices of the peace ac­
ting together would have absolute jurisdiction to send a person to a Federal Peniten­
tiary.54
Here is revealed the erroneous notion that the section 96 standard restricts the 
inferior rather than the superior courts. It is clear constitutional law that the 
functions and powers of non-section 96 judges may be increased as long as the 
constitutional line is not crossed. Drawing on, though not quoting the McEvoy 
statement noted above, Judge Harper apparently established the line at the in­
dictable 1 summary distinction in terms of offence jurisdiction and at the two 
years level in terms of punishment. His general conclusion was, accordingly, 
that the Provincial Court cannot validly exercise jurisdiction to try “ serious in­
dictable offences” .
On judicial review, Stevenson J. of Court of Queen’s Bench quashed the 
jurisdictional decision of Harper Prov. Ct. J. He quite rightly recognized the 
limited scope of the McEvoy decision yet, in distinguishing it, adopted much 
too narrow a definition of “ concurrent” jurisdiction:
In my opinion jurisdiction is concurrent in two or more courts only if the part in­
stituting the proceeding has an unrestricted choice of forum. In other words, in 
criminal matters, the initiating party — the Crown, the Attorney General, the pro­
secutor or the informant — could choose the court in which the proceeding would be 
initiated and tried.
Having established this “ straw man” definition, it was then applied to save the 
Criminal Code provisions since it is “ the accused, not the initiating party, that 
has the choice of forum” .55 But jurisdiction is to be viewed as concurrent when 
two courts can determine the same matter between the same parties, nuances 
of procedure notwithstanding. Section 96 is not to be so easily evaded. In 
criminal law the key elements seem to be offence jurisdiction coupled with 
severity of possible punishment and perhaps the question of a jury trial.
Turning to historical inquiry, Stevenson J. focussed on the Court of 
General Sessions of the Peace as the pivotal body. He apparently viewed the 
fact that Sessions was an “ inferior” court as determinative of its non-section 
96 status. Nowhere in the reasons for judgment is there an express placing of 
the court outside of the section, notwithstanding the fact that two other “ in­
ferior” courts — County and District — are specifically included. As reviewed 
above, Sessions in New Brunswick was found to have had only misdemeanor 
indictable jurisdiction after 1831 (the 1867 legislation removing even this was 
not referred to) and in Nova Scotia, except Halifax County, only summary 
jurisdiction. Ignoring the situation in Quebec, Stevenson J. merely quoted an 
1869 federal statute re-enacting the 1859 Canadian Act Respecting the Prompt 
and Summary Administration o f Criminal Justice in Certain Cases without ex-
$*R. v. Charters, supra, note 2 at 60.
>sRe Harper, supra, note 2 at 388.
plaining the significance he attached to it.56 That Act concerned the summary 
trial of various larceny offences where value did not exceed $10 and various 
assault and bawdy house offences. The maximum punishment under the Act 
was six months. From this statute, a jump in logic is made to the conclusion 
that Sessions in Ontario in 1867 had jurisdiction “ over felonies other than 
treason and capital felonies” . This bare statement is presented uncomplicated 
by the fact that only County Court judges could preside at such Sessions and 
the constitutional effect this might have in placing Sessions in the section 96 
context. Having found that an “ inferior court” in at least one province exer­
cised jurisdiction over “ serious criminal offences” , Stevenson J. determined 
in favour of the present Code scheme and the jurisdiction of the Provincial 
Court in relation to the specific offences charged:
Does the fact that the jurisdiction now given to inferior courts encompasses all in- 
dicatable offences except those enumerated in s.427 of the Code offend ss. 96 to 100 
of the Constitution? I do not think it does. The legislation has not altered the 
character of the inferior courts nor has it conferred on them functions that were 
reserved exclusively to superior, district or county courts in 1867.57
Unfortunately, in arriving at this conclusion Stevenson J. did not review the 
erosion of superior court criminal jurisdiction since 1867. To be fair, such an 
examination was not necessary to determine the jurisdictional issues before the 
court but was necessary properly to support such opinion. The reasons for 
decision are sorely inadequate to support the conclusions reached. It must 
again be stressed that the decision of Stevenson J. is based on the jurisdiction 
perceived to have been enjoyed by Sessions in Ontario in 1867, thereby 
transforming the exception into the standard, as such jurisdiction was found in 
neither New Brunswick nor Nova Scotia.
Conclusions
If the Supreme Court’s interpretation of section 96 in Grondin — that the 
standard for the powers and jurisdiction of superior, district and county courts 
is a provincial rather than a uniform national standard — is accepted and ap­
plied in the criminal law area, then the conclusion is inescapable that the 
Criminal Code jurisdictional provisions in respect of indictable offences are 
unconstitutional in at least New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. Criminal law in 
Canada has followed the pre-Confederation law of the Province of Canada 
rather than accommodating the variances in jurisdiction in the two Maritime 
provinces where indictable offence jurisdiction was restricted in 1867 to what 
are now section 96 courts. Alternatively, if section 96 creates a national stan­
dard then the problem is to identify that standard. Putting Sessions on one side 
or the other of the section 96 line does not necessarily resolve placement of cer­
tain offences owing again to pre-Confederation provincial variations. These 
are resolvable, however, by the “ confirming to” approach of section 96 
analysis.
Section 427 of the Criminal Code enumerates those offences within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of superior courts of criminal jurisdiction. When com-
56S.C. 1869, c.32; C.S.C. 1859, c.105, ss 1, 30, 31.
pared with offences similarly reserved in pre-Confederation Canada, New 
Brunswick and Nova Scotia, and even the Criminal Code of 1892, the list is an 
abbreviated one. This erosion of exclusive superior court offence jurisdiction 
and the conferral of such jurisdiction on non-section 96 courts is, at minimum, 
open to question on section 96 grounds. Such offences represent the core of 
jurisdiction for which the section 96 historical inquiry is undertaken. Some of 
the offence erosion may be validated as a result of the change in punishment, 
from the death penalty to imprisonment, altering the character of such of­
fences. But this does not justify all of the offence erosion. It depends on which 
provincial jurisdictional standard is adopted as the proper one for section 96 
purposes.
The offences in issue in Charters and McGann were punishable by life im­
prisonment. As such, one may safely conclude on the Grondin approach to 
section 96 that they were, indeed, beyond the constitutional competence of the 
Provincial Court in New Brunswick. Both of the reasons for decision of the 
courts which examined the issue are flawed, one being too broad, the other too 
narrow. It is unfortunate that this important constitutional issue did not reach 
at least the Court of Appeal. The constitutional propriety of the conviction 
and imprisonment of many tried before Provincial Courts across Canada re­
mains in question.
J.P. McEVOY*
•O f the Faculty of Law, University of New Brunswick
APPENDIX
New Brunswick
In 1832 a Commission of Inquiry was appointed to examine the judicial institutions of 
New Brunswick and in particular the fee schedules and emoluments of the various law 
officers. Although the Commissioners — Ward Chipman, Robert Parker and William 
Kinnear — generally restricted their attention to the trial of divil matters, their report 
provides a convenient reference point from which to commence a section 96 historical 
review as it includes the following table of the then judicial institutions of the province:
Supreme Court
Courts of Nisi Prius )
Courts of Oyer and Terminer ) combined under the 
and Gaol Delivery ) name of Circuit Courts 
Inferior Courts of Common Pleas, in the respective counties 
Courts of General Sessions of the Peace, in the respective counties'
Courts of Justices of the Peace having jurisdiction in Civil Suits 
City Court in the City of Saint John having the like jurisdiction 
Justices of the Peace in the exercise of their power as Conservators 
of the Peace, and in apprehending and committing Criminals, 
and in Summary Convictions under penal statutes 
Court of Chancery 
Court of Vice Admiralty 
Governor and Council [in various capacities].2
Of these courts, only the Supreme Court, Circuit Courts (particularly of Oyer and Ter­
miner and Gaol Delivery), Sessions of the Peace and Justices of the Peace exercised 
criminal jurisdiction as trial courts.
Having identified the court structure, the 1854-55 Revised Statutes in turn provide 
a convenient point from which to begin analysis of the jurisdiction exercised by the 
criminal courts. Title XXXIX of the Revised Statutes is entitled “ Of the Criminal 
Law” , chapters 143 to 155 of which detail various public order offences, both felony 
and misdemeanor. In total, ninety-three offences are created — forty-five felonies, 
thirty-six misdemeanors and twelve not expressly classified.5 The accompanying Table 
identifies the numbers of express felonies and misdemeanors by the maximum penalty 
allowed for the offence.
'The 1785 Charter of the City of Saint John created the mayor, recorder and aldermen as justices of the peace 
with authority to hold Sessions of the Peace for the city and county of Saint John: printed in S.N.B. 1786-1836, 
Appendix 2.
2 Report Made to His Excellency the Lieutenant-Governor o f the Province o f New Brunswick by the Commission 
Appointed to Inquire into the Judicial Institutions o f the Province (Fredericton, 1833) at 2-4.
3This total excludes both c. 154, Of other Felonies, which is concerned with parties to the principal offence and c.
155, Of the Definition o f Terms and Explanations which, as its title indicates, is merely a definition chapter.



















* c. 145, s.2 (incest) ** c.153, s.l (attempted arson)
*** c. 145, s.5; c. 149, ss 9, 12; c. 151, ss 16, 17; c. 153, s.15.
As a general matter and consistent with the common understanding of the division bet­
ween felony and misdemeanor, these statistics indicate a high correlation between 
classification of offence and severity of punishment: offences classified as felonies had a 
prescribed penalty greater than two years imprisonment (44 of 45); and those as misde­
meanors, two years or less (30 of 36). Viewed another way, offences for which the 
prescribed penalty was greater than two years imprisonment were classified as felonies 
(44 of 50) and those not exceeding two years were misdemeanors (30 of 31).
The question now arises as to which courts enjoyed jurisdiction over particular 
criminal offences. For purposes of criminal procedure, offences were historically 
classified as being either indictable or summary conviction according to whether they 
were tried by jury.4 Summary conviction procedure was codified as c. 138 of the Revised 
Statutes, Of Summary Convictions. That Act provided that a justice might try any ac­
cused against whom an information were laid alleging commission of “ any offence 
punishable by summary conviction” .5 As to which were summary offences, earlier 
statutes had expressly allowed summary trials for such offences as larceny, assault and 
injuring cattle.6 A problem for the historical researcher arises, however, as these earlier 
statutes were repealed by the Revised Statutes and the summary conviction procedure 
consolidated into the new c. 138 without enacting an express link to the offences con­
cerned; i.e., offences were not expressed to be triable on summary conviction. As a 
creation of statute, standard rules of interpretation would limit summary procedure to 
offences expressly so identified. In the absence of such identification, it may be assumed 
that only minor offences, such as the so-called “ police offences” , were considered ap­
propriate for summary procedure and this jurisdiction of a justice of the peace may be
4See J.C . Smith and B. Hogan, Criminal Law, 5th ed. (London: Butterworths, 1983) at 25; Blackstone’s Com­
mentaries, vol. IV (1769) at 277.
5R.S.N.B. 1854-55, c. 138, ss 1, 11. See generally Blackstone’s Commentaries, vol. IV (1769), c.20.
6An Act to consolidate and improve the Laws Relative to the Administration o f Criminal Justice, S.N.B. 1849, c. 
30, ss 73, 74; An Act for the more summary punishment o f Persons guilty o f  maliciously killing, maiming, 
disfiguring or otherwise injuring Cattle, S.N.B. 1830, c. 22.
dismissed from further consideration in terms of the dividing line between section 96 
and non-section 96 courts. Such jurisdiction may be considered as having been non­
section 96.
Title XL of the Revised Statutes, headed “ Of The Administration of Criminal 
Justice” , encompasses chapters 156 to 160. Chapter 156, O f Proceedings before Indict­
ment, details the duties of a justice before whom a complaint was laid concerning an in­
dictable offence. In effect, the duty of the justice was to conduct a preliminary inquiry 
and either discharge the accused or commit to trial. If the latter, the justice was to admit 
the accused to bail or remand to gaol and to take recognizances of witnesses. This 
general procedure applied whether the indictable offence was a felony or a misde­
meanor. Chapters 157 to 160 then follow a normal procedural progression: c. 157, Of 
Recognizances in Criminal Cases', c. 158, O f Proceedings on Indictment’, c. 159, Of 
Trial', and c. 160, O f Error, Punishment and Expenses. In these chapters the jurisdic­
tional key is unlocked not on the basis of the procedural division between indictable and 
summary offences, but rather on the substantive division between felony and misde­
meanor. It must be acknowledged that both the justices in Sessions and the Assize Com­
missioners in England enjoyed comprehensive criminal jurisdiction. Commissions of 
Oyer and Terminer and Gaol Delivery empowered the holders “ to hear and determine 
all treasons, felonies and misdemeanors” . These Commissions were issued to judges of 
the superior courts together with other persons, ususally the justices or magistrates, but 
specified that the judges only were “ of the quorum, so that the rest cannot act without 
them” .7 The Commissions of Oyer and Terminer and Gaol Delivery constituted the 
holders a superior court for the trial of criminal offences.* It must be remembered that 
those receiving commissions acted not pursuant to whatever other position they may 
have held but only under the commission. Thus the fact that magistrates or others in 
early New Brunswick were also appointed commissioners does not detract from the 
stature of the court. In any event, as a result of legislative intervention, after 1854 the 
Supreme Court judges in New Brunswick held circuit courts without the necessity of 
either a commission or the judicial assistance of “others” .9 Circuit Courts after 1854 
were, therefore, undoubtedly section 96 courts exclusively.
As originally constituted, General Sessions in New Brunswick enjoyed an extensive 
jurisdiction similar to that in England. For example, the 1785 Sunbury County 
“ Charter” appointed eight individuals as justices of the peace and named four of them 
as being of the quorum for the purposes of holding:
two Courts of General Sessions of the Peace in each year...[with] full power and 
authority to enquire of, hear and determine within the County aforesaid, all and all 
manner of felonies, imprisonments, riots, routs, oppressions, extorsions, forestall- 
ings, regratings, trespasses, offences and all and singular other evils, deeds and of­
fences whatsoever...in as ample manner and form as Justices of the Peace [in 
England].10
Doubts as to the limits of jurisdiction of Sessions, arising from the imprecise restriction 
“ in any case of difficulty” , were statutorily resolved by enacting express limits on 
jurisdiction. The 1854-55 Revised Statutes expressed this in c. 158, O f Proceedings on 
Indictment, s.3:
1 Blackstone’s Commentaries, vol. IV (1769) at 267. See also C. Turner, Kenney's Outlines o f Criminal Law 
(Cambridge, U.K., 1952) at 453-54; J. Stephen, History o f the Criminal Law o f England, vol. I (London, 1883) 
at 97-111.
' j .  Chitty, Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law, vol. I (Philadephia, 1819) at 109.
9An Act to regulate the Circuit Courts, and Courts o f  Oyer and Terminer, and Sittings after Term, S.N.B. 
1854-55, c.19, s.l.
10Printed in S.N.B. 1786-1836, Appendix 3.
Every crime of felony, incest or adultery, shall be dealt with in the Courts of Oyer 
and Terminer or General Gaol Delivery, except where power may be specially given 
by law to any other Court to try and determine the same.11
The statues contain no express conferral of such power on any other court. This restric­
tion of Sessions jurisdiction is consistent with that adopted in England in 1842 which 
forbade the Sessions from trying “ any Person or Persons for any Treason, Murder, or 
Capital Felony, or for any Felony...punishable by Transportation beyond the Seas for 
Life, or for any of the following offences...[a list of eighteen classes of offences]” .12 
Other jurisdictional provisions in the Revised Statutes enacted that either Sessions or 
any Court of Oyer and Terminer could deal with lotteries as common and public 
nuisances and that Sessions had power to try “ larceny, accessories thereto, and all 
receivers of stolen goods, when the value of the property does not exceed five 
pounds” .13
Thus in 1854-55 justices of the peace exercised a summary jurisdiction in relation to 
minor offences, justices of the peace acting in the Court of General Sessions enjoyed 
general jurisdiction over misdemeanors, and superior court judges in the Supreme or 
Circuit Courts exercised exclusive felony jurisdiction. Focusing attention again on the 
above Table of offences, the misdemeanor offence with the greatest penalty — incest 
punishable by imprisonment not to exceed fourteen years — was in fact within the ex­
clusive jurisdiction of the superior court and expressly excluded from Sessions by c. 158, 
s.3, reproduced above. It would appear, then, that the most important function of Ses­
sions as a criminal court lay in the trial of minor offences.14 The substantive criminal 
law of the 1854-55 Revised Statutes remained essentially unaltered until the coming into 
force of the Constitution Act, 1867. Any variation involved reduction of the number of 
offences for which the prescribed penalty was death and the addition of a few new 
crimes.15 With respect to court structure, however, legislation was approved barely two 
weeks before the coming into force of the new constitution establishing a County Court 
system for the province. Significantly, thereafter no petit jury was to be summoned to 
attend General Sessions of the Peace, thereby formally removing the jurisdiction of Ses­
sions to try any indictable offence. Indictments found at Sessions were to be handed 
over to the new County Court to be “ proceeded with to trial and conviction in the same 
manner as in the Circuit Court” .16
With respect to New Brunswick, historical inquiry leads to the conclusions that, on
1 July 1867: (i) section 96 courts enjoyed exclusive jurisdiction in relation to the trial of 
all offences classified as felony; (ii) in general, any offence for which the prescribed 
punishment exceeded two years imprisonment was classified as felony; (iii) section 96 
courts enjoyed exclusive jurisdiction in relation to the trial of all offences prosecuted by
11 Earlier versions of this provision are found in An Act to Consolidate and Improve the Laws Relative to the Ad­
ministration o f Criminal Justice, S.N.B. 1849, c. 30, s. 24; An Act for improving the Administration o f Justice in 
Criminal Cases, S.N.B. 1831, c.14, s.8.
12 An Act to define the Jurisdiction o f Justices in General and Quarter Sessions o f the Peace, (U.K.), 5 & 6 Viet., 
c.38, s.l.
xiO f Proceedings on Indictment, R.S.N.B. 1854-55, c.158, s.23; O f Trial, R.S.N.B. 1854-55, c.159, s.25.
UA. Monro, New Brunswick; with a Brief Outline o f Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island: Their History, 
Civil Divisions, Geography and Productions (Halifax, 1855) at 30: “ The Sessions regulate the business of the 
county, such as the levying of rates for its necessary expenditure, granting tavern licences, determining cases of 
bastardy and settlement and they also try petty criminal cases” .
lsAn Act for taking away the punishment o f death in certain cases, and substituting other punishments in lieu 
thereof, S.N.B. 1862, c.21; An Act further to amend the Law relating to offences against the person, S.N.B. 
1864, c.4; An Act relating to Larceny and other similar offences, S.N.B. 1864, c.6.
16An Act to Establish County Courts, S.N.B. 1867, c.10 (enacted 17 June 1867).
indictment; and (iv) trial by petit jury could be held only before a section 96 court. Ig­
noring the 1867 County Courts Act would remove the last two conclusions, in light of 
the misdemeanor jurisdiction of Sessions.
Nova Scotia
In 1824 the Nova Scotia Legislature addressed perceived problems in the administration 
of civil and criminal justice. The most important feature of the reorganization of the 
province’s court structure was the requirement that the First Justice of the Court of 
Common Pleas and the Court of General Sessions of the Peace in each district be an at­
torney with at least ten years experience in the practice of law.17 This change in the 
qualifications necessary for these judicial offices not only improved the quality of 
justice administered but also brought about another significant, though probably 
unintended, development. The historically broad criminal jurisdiction of justices in Ses­
sions had been restricted by usage to the less serious offences, in deference to the 
superior courts. With the appointment of equally-qualified judges to the Sessions and 
Common Pleas, those courts began to expand the exercise of their jurisdictions to 
become in effect concurrent courts to the Supreme Court." Consequently, criticism 
began to be expressed regarding the fiscal wisdom of funding distinct but concurrent 
court systems. In 1841 the Legislature ended this duplication by enacting An Act to im­
prove the Administration o f the Law, and to reduce the number o f Courts o f Justice 
within this Province, and to diminish the expense o f the Judiciary therein .19 As its title 
would indicate, the Act reduced the number of courts by abolishing, on the civil side, 
the Court of Common Pleas and, on the criminal side, the indictable offence jurisdic­
tion of the Court of General Sessions of the Peace in each county except Halifax. To 
achieve abolition of the criminal jurisdiction, it was enacted:
That, from and after the passing of this Act, no Bill of Indictment shall be found or 
preferred in or before any Court of General Sessions of the Peace (Halifax 
excepted,) nor shall any Trial by Petit Jury be had in or before the same, but in all 
other respects such Courts of General Sessions of the Peace shall have and exercise 
the same powers as heretofore by Law such Courts can or may have been used to 
have and exercise... .20
Consequently, in seventeen of eighteen Nova Scotia counties the Supreme Court gained 
exclusive jurisdiction to try all indictable offences, it being the only court to sit with a 
petit jury. Only in Halifax County was the criminal jurisdiction of Sessions retained, in­
11 Act to make further Provision for the Equal Administration o f Justice in the Province o f Nova Scotia, S.N.S. 
1824, c.38. The province was divided into the districts of Cape Breton, Halifax, and three districts comprising the 
rest of the province, labelled Eastern, Middle and Western.
'*Supreme Court Act, S.N.S. 1809, c.15, s.7 established the qualifications for appointment as Assistant Justice 
of the Supreme Court as ten years as an attorney, with at least five years in practice before the appointment.
19S.N.S. 1841, c.3. There is no report of a commission or committee to explain the purposes of this Act. A 
newspaper account of the Assembly debate of 23 February 1841, regarding creation of a committee to consider 
the matter, is found in Acadian Recorder (6 March 1841). It notes that Mr. Young (Inverness) moved in favour of 
a judiciary bill for essentially fiscal reasons: the number of common law judges; the anomalous situation of two 
distinct courts with concurrent jurisdiction; and the frequency of the holdings of courts with their attendant 
juries. The creation of the committee is reported to have been approved by a large majority. The report of the 
Committee is a mere handwritten resolution to effect the abolition of the courts o f Common Pleas and Sessions.
20Ibid. s.5. See also s.24: “ from and after the passing of this Act, no Petit Jury shall be summoned or required to 
attend at any Court of General Sessions of the Peace for any County within this Province, Halifax excepted” ; 
and Of General and Special Sessions, R.S.N.S. 1864, c.44, s.5: “ Bills of indictment may be preferred, found and 
tried, and judgment thereon given, in the general sessions of the peace for the county of Halifax, as heretofore” . 
See also Of Juries, R.S.N.S. 1864, c.136, s.20 re petit jury for Halifax Sessions.
eluding ability to sit with a petit jury.21 This court structure for the trial of indictable of­
fences — a unitary system in the Supreme Court for most of Nova Scotia with a dual 
system for Halifax County — remained unaltered to the time of Confederation.
A comparison of the returns of both the Supreme Court sitting at Halifax and the 
Court of General Sessions of the Peace for Halifax County during the period 1851-1861 
leads to the conclusion that the Halifax Sessions reverted to a court for the trial of less 
serious offences, while the more serious were tried by the Supreme Court. There were 
forty-one cases tried at Sessions over that eleven year period: thirty-six were for assault, 
three for breaking windows, one for larceny and one bastardy case.22 In only two cases
— an assault and the larceny conviction — did the Court impose a sentence of imprison­
ment, and in both the term was three months. In contrast, during the same period the 
Supreme Court sitting at Halifax tried sixty cases as follows:
As with the Sessions returns, all accused were convicted. In five cases the sentence im­
posed was a fine, the maximum being £25; in the others, the sentence ranged from two 
months imprisonment to death.23
Jurisdiction to try offences prosecuted in a summary way was conferred on justices 
sitting either alone or in combination as stipendary magistrates or in Sessions. Stipen- 
dary magistrates were empowered to try,
all larcenies where the value of the goods stolen shall not exceed twenty dollars, 
receiving of stolen goods, assaults, batteries, riots, petty trespasses, malicious or 
wanton injuries to property, and breaches of the peace
and to punish persons convicted by imprisonment not to exceed sixty days or by fine not 
to exceed $20 and costs.24 At Sessions, five justices sitting together had jurisdiction to 
try in a summary manner “ all larcenies when the value of the property stolen shall not
21 Ibid. s.24. The exclusion of Halifax from the ambit of the Act is unexplained. It was referred to neither in the 
account of the debate reported in the Acadian Recorder, supra, note 19 nor in the report of the Assembly Com­
mittee considering the abolition of the inferior courts. Its exclusion is all the more puzzling in light of the contem­
poraneous consideration and passage of a bill to incorporate Halifax and constitute both a municipal government 
and court structure: An Act to Incorporate the Town o f Halifax, S.N.S. 1841, c.55.
22“ Return of the Convictions for Criminal Offences in the Court of Sessions for the County of Halifax” , 12 
December 1861: Public Archives of Nova Scotia, RG34, 312-J3. A return for 1865 shows three assaults punished 
by fines and three assaults punished by terms of imprisonment of ten days and three months. In 1866 only three 
cases were tried — larceny, twenty days; assault, three months; and bastardy, a  fine of $20.
23“ Return of the Names of Parties, the Nature of Offence, and the Punishment awarded to persons convicted of 
Criminal Offences in the Supreme Court at Halifax for the last Ten Years” , 31 December 1861: Public Archives 
of Nova Scotia, RG34, 312-J3.
24 O f Stipendary or Police Magistrates, R.S.N.S. 1864, c. 129, ss 6, 8. Note that on the trial of all larcenies where 
only one magistrate had been appointed, that magistrate was to sit with two justices of the peace and a jury of 

























exceed one hundred dollars” and could, on conviction, impose either a fine not ex­
ceeding $40, or imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both. For other minor of­
fences, provision was made to allow summary trial by justices sitting alone or in com­
bination. For example, two justices could try common assaults and batteries and in 
sentencing could impose a fine not exceeding $8.25
Turning attention to the substantive classification of crimes as being felony or 
misdemeanor, one finds that the Nova Scotia draughter was lax in expressly classifying 
offences in such terms. Examination of Part IV of the Revised Statutes of Nova Scotia, 
1864, headed “ Of the Criminal Law and the Administration of Criminal Justice” — 
particularly Title XLI “ Of Offences Against The Government” — reveals 106 offence 
provisions — forty-three felonies, six misdemeanors and fifty-seven not expressly iden­
tified. Of the forty-three felonies, one is punishable by death, six by life imprisonment, 
thirteen by fourteen years imprisonment, sixteen by seven years imprisonment, three 
each by five and three years imprisonment and one by two years imprisonment. Of the 
six misdemeanors, one is punishable by imprisonment for five years, for one the penalty 
is unclear and for four the penalty is left to the discretion of the court. The fifty-seven 
unclassified offences include sixteen punishable by imprisonment by five, three in which 
the penalty is left to the discretion of the court, and thirty-eight punishable by lesser 
terms of imprisonment.26
With respect to Nova Scotia, historical inquiry leads to the conclusions that, on 1 
July 1867: except for Halifax County, (i) section 96 courts enjoyed exclusive jurisdiction 
in relation to the trial of all offences classified as felonies; (ii) section 96 courts enjoyed 
exclusive jurisdiction in relation to the trial of all offences prosecuted by indictment; 
and, (iii) trial by petit jury could be had only before a section 96 court. Only in Halifax 
County did a similar criminal jurisdiction lie in a non-section 96 court.
Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction — Quebec
From the coming into force of An Act to Re-unite the Provinces o f Upper and Lower 
Canada and for the Government o f  Canada until their separation as provinces of the 
new Canada in 1867, Ontario and Quebec shared a common legislature and substantive 
criminal law.27 Historical inquiry into the criminal jurisdiction of the courts of these two 
provinces is greatly eased by the consolidation of the laws in 1859 of the former Upper 
Canada and in 1860 of the former Lower Canada. The separate provincial consolida­
tions will be used to identify the court structure in both sections of the united province 
and the common consolidation will clarify issues of jurisdiction.
The Court of Queen’s Bench of Lower Canada, Crown Side, enjoyed by statutory 
enactment complete criminal jurisdiction to try and determine all manner of offences, 
felonies or misdemeanors, except those within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Admiral­
ty. A qualification, if one may call it that, to this expansive jurisdiction was provided by 
limiting removal of cases into the Queen’s Bench from other courts to offences before 
any Court of General or Quarter Sessions “ in which a trial by jury is by law allowed” . It
2>Of Petty Offences, Trespasses and Assaults, R.S.N.S. 1864, c. 147, ss 1, 3, 23. See also, for example: Of Of­
fences Relating to the Army and Navy, R.S.N.S. 1864, c. 157, ss 1-4 (maximum fine $200 and in default of pay­
ment, imprisonment not to exceed twelve months); Of Offences Against Religion, R.S.N.S. 1864, c. 159, ss 1-4 
(maximum fine $40 and in default of payment, gaol term not to exceed four days); O f Offences Against Public 
Morals, R.S.N.S. 1864, c 160, s.l (drunkenness — maximum fine $4 and in default, gaol term not to exceed four 
days).
26Included in this group are rape (maximum life imprisonment), manslaughter (maximum fourteen years), 
shooting or stabbing to avoid arrest, perjury, carnal knowledge of any girl between the ages of ten and twelve 
years and larceny, each punishable by imprisonment not to exceed seven years.
27(U.K.) 3 & 4 Viet., c. 35.
was further provided that in any district in which the Court of Quarter Sessions had 
been discontinued or no such court appointed to be held, the Queen’s Bench could try 
and determine all “ matters and appeals” within the cognizance of Sessions.2' A 
separate enactment expressly provided that Commissions of Oyer and Terminer and 
General Gaol Delivery could be issued at times other than during sittings of the Queen’s 
Bench, as circumstances required.29
For purposes of administration of justice, Quebec was territorially divided into 
twenty districts, seven then existing and thirteen planned or so-called new districts.30 
Courts of General Sessions of the Peace were held in the Districts of Montreal and 
Quebec and, when a proclamation was issued by the Governor, Courts of Quarter Ses­
sions of the Peace could be held in the other five existing districts and in the thirteen new 
districts. It would appear that the Court of Sessions was considered as merely sup­
plementary to the Queen’s Bench since in all districts, apart from Montreal and Quebec, 
the Governor could either institute or discontinue holding a Court of Sessions depen­
ding whether “ the dispatch of the criminal business of the district renders it necessary” . 
Two justices could preside at a General Sessions, a judge of the Superior Court sitting 
alone could hold Quarter Sessions, except in Montreal and Quebec, and in those two 
cities the Recorder or Inspector and Superintendent of Police sitting alone could hold 
Quarter Sessions. The criminal jurisdiction was legislatively defined such that Sessions 
might “ hear and determine all matters relating to the preservation of the peace, and 
whatsoever is then by them cognizable according to the Laws of England then in force 
in Lower Canada” .31 Finally, the Recorders and the Inspectors and Superintendents of 
Police for the cities of Montreal and Quebec were constituted justices of the peace with 
the jurisdiction of two justices. As well, a justice sitting alone was given jurisdiction 
over certain minor offences within the territorial limits of any municipality.32
Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction — Ontario
The criminal jurisdiction of the Court of Queen’s Bench for Upper Canada was 
established by statute as being equivalent to that of “ a Superior Court of...Criminal 
jurisdiction” in England.33 Accordingly, the Court had theoretically plenary criminal 
jurisdiction. By separate enactment, Courts of Oyer and Terminer and General Gaol 
Delivery were to be held twice yearly in each county outside of Toronto and three times 
yearly in Toronto. Such commissions, when issued, were directed to judges of the 
superior courts, although provision was also made for inclusion of County Court judges 
and counsel learned in the law.34 Justices of the peace were to hold Courts of Sessions
21 An Act Respecting the Court o f Queen’s Bench, C.S.L.C. I860, c. 77, ss 67, 69, 70. Note that in exercise of its 
original criminal jurisdiction, the Court of Queen’s Bench could sit with only one judge (ss 71, 72), and that in 
each district two terms of the Court were to be held in each year (s.77).
29An Act Respecting Courts o f Oyer and Terminer, C.S.L.C. 1860, c. 96, s.l.
30 An Act Respecting the Division o f Lower Canada into Districts for the Administration o f Justice, C.S.L.C. 
1860, c. 76.
3 lAn Act respecting the Courts o f General or Quarter Sessions o f the Peace, Justices o f the Peace, and Special 
Sessions o f the Peace, C.S.L.C. 1860, c. 97, ss 1,2 ,5 . Note that the jurisdiction of the Superior Court was civil in 
nature, aside from its supervisory jurisdiction over the lower courts: An Act Respecting the Superior Court, 
C.S.L.C. 1860, c. 78, ss 1, 4. Other civil courts were the Circuit Courts (C.S.L.C. 1860, c. 79, s.2) and the Com­
missioners’ Courts (C.S.L.C. 1860, c.94). One assumes that justices did not often sit in Sessions since, unlike 
Recorders, they were omitted from Sessions jurisdiction by the Criminal Code, S.C. 1892, c.29.
12An Act Respecting the Police in Quebec and Montreal, and certain regulations o f Police in other Towns and 
Villages, C.S.L.C. 1860, c. 102, ss 1(1), 9-20.
33An Act respecting the Superior Courts o f Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction, C.S.U.C. 1859, c.10, s.3.
3*An Act respecting Courts o f Oyer and Terminer and General Gaol Delivery and o f Assize and Nisi Prius, 
C.S.U.C. 1859, c .l l ,  ss 1, 2.
quarterly in the counties of the province. But rather than one of the justices simpliciter 
presiding as chairman of Sessions, that function was specifically reserved for a judge of 
the County Court, thereby allowing the judges of that court of restricted civil jurisdic­
tion a role in the administration of criminal justice.33 As with the Courts of Oyer and 
Terminer and General Gaol Delivery, the jurisdiction of Sessions was not specifically 
declared in the Consolidated Statutes for Upper Canada. Within municipalities, 
separate courts were established at two levels. A Recorder’s Court, with a barrister of 
five years standing, or in his absence the mayor sitting either alone or assisted by 
aldermen, was constituted with the same criminal jurisdiction as the Court of Sessions 
exercised in counties. As well, justices of the peace, police magistrates and mayors were 
empowered to try offences against municipal bylaws.36 In addition, specific minor of­
fences were expressly made triable by justices of the peace sitting alone.37
Consolidated Statutes of Canada, 1859
Examination of Title 11, “ Criminal Law” , of the 1859 Consolidated Statutes of 
Canada reveals 157 offence provisions.u Of this total, there are seventy-nine felonies, 
forty-two misdemeanors, and thirty-six not specifically identified as either but including 
such obvious felonies as murder, accessory after the fact thereto and manslaughter. The 
accompanying Table correlates the numbers of express felonies and misdemeanors with 
the maximum penalty prescribed for the offence.














35Art Act relating to the Court o f General Quarter Sessions o f  the Peace, C.S.U.C. 1859, c.17, ss 3, 5.
16An Act respecting the Municipal Institutions o f Upper Canada, C.S.U.C. 1859, c.54, ss 366, 369-71.
37E.g., An Act to prevent the Profanation o f the Lord’s Day, in Upper Canada, C.S.U.C. 1859, c. 104 (fines not 
to exceed $40 or in default imprisonment not to exceed three months); An Act respecting Petty Trespasses in Up­
per Canada, C.S.U.C. 1859, c. 105 (animal trespass for which fines not to exceed $10).
3,In chapters 89-98 (excluding c.97: An Act respecting Principals in the second degree, accessories, and second 
convictions).
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* Includes 5 offences punished “ accordingly”
Of the offences not specifically identified as one or the other, twenty-one are punishable 
by fines, fourteen by maximum terms of imprisonment and one by death. Of the of­
fences punishable by terms of imprisonment, three are for life, six for fourteen years, 
one for three years, three for any term not less than two years and one for three months. 
The twenty-one offences punishable by fine alone are made triable before justices of the 
peace.
The information set out in the Table is, however, not as significant in determining 
the jurisdiction of section 96 courts as was the case with New Brunswick and Nova 
Scotia. In the two Maritime provinces, Sessions had been restricted in its criminal 
jurisdiction; this was not so in the Canadas where Sessions, in general, retained its for­
mal plenary jurisdiction subject to the “ any case of difficulty” proviso. In this regard it 
must be remembered that in Lower Canada, a Court of Sessions or its equivalent could 
be constituted in three ways: (i) justices of the peace sitting together; (ii) a Superior 
Court judge sitting alone; and (iii) in the cities of Montreal and Quebec, the Recorder, 
or Inspector and Superintendent of Police, sitting alone. In Upper Canada there were 
two means to constitute Sessions: (i) justices of the peace with a County Court judge as 
chairman; and (ii) in municipalities, the Recorder or Mayor sitting in the Recorder’s 
Court. Given this variety of combinations to constitute Sessions, the legislature might 
limit jurisdiction by either a general restriction — thereby treating the courts, though 
differently constituted, as equivalents — or by varying jurisdiction depending on the 
constitution of the court. As to the former, the only provision in the 1859 Canadian 
Consolidation specifically limiting the jurisdiction of Sessions in general did so by pro­
hibiting trial at Sessions of eight misdemeanor offences dealing with larcenies by ser­
vants, trustees or bankers, each punishable by imprisonment not exceeding three 
years.”  As to the latter, neither justices nor Recorders had jurisdiction to try any of five 
felony and one misdemeanor offences concerning explosives and one felony offence 
relating to arson.40
Finally, the 1859 Consolidation authorized Recorders generally, Inspectors and 
Superintendents of Police in Montreal and Quebec, Police Magistrates in Upper 
Canada and two justices of the peace, sheriffs and deputy-sheriffs in Lower Canada to 
try the following offences summarily: (1) simple larceny not exceeding $1 in value, (2) 
attempted larceny from the person, (3) simple larceny, (4) aggravated assault, (5) assault 
on a female or on a male child, (6) assault on a magistrate or other officer, and (7) keep­
ing or being an inmate of a disorderly or bawdy house. With respect to the first three of­
fences, consent of the accused was a prerequisite to the exercise of summary jurisdic­
tion, but for the latter four, jurisdiction was absolute. The maximum terms of im­
19 An Act respecting Offences against Person and Property, C.S.C. 1859, c.92, ss 51-66.
40An Act respecting Offences against the Person, C.S.C. 1859, c. 91, ss 15, 16, 18 per s. 47; An Act respecting 
Arson and other malicious injury to property, C.S.C. 1859, c. 93, ss 2,3,11,13 per s.39.
prisonment provided under the Act were three months in respect of the first three of­
fences and six months for the last four.41 In addition, particular statutes authorized 
justices of the peace to try various minor offences summarily and impose punishment 
by way of fine.
The courts of criminal jurisdiction for the provinces of Upper and Lower Canada 
as reflected in the 1859-60 consolidations continued structurally unaltered until and 
beyond Confederation. With respect to jurisdiction, however, an important limitation 
was enacted in 1861 with respect to Quarter Sessions and Recoder’s Courts to remove 
jurisdiction to try “ Treasons and Felonies, for conviction whereof the punishment of 
Death is imposed” .42 In addition to offences constituting treason, the felony offences 
thus removed from the jurisdiction of Sessions and Recorders were: murder, poisoning 
or stabbing with intent to murder, rape, carnal abuse of girls under ten years of age, 
buggery, robbery with violence, burglary with assault with intent to murder, arson to an 
occupied dwelling house, arson of a ship, and endangering a vessel.43 In 1865 a max­
imum penalty of life imprisonment was substituted for the death in seven of these of­
fences, leaving only murder, rape and carnal abuse of girls under ten as the only felonies 
subject to the death penalty.44
Historical inquiry in respect of Ontario and Quebec leads to the following conclu­
sion: (i) a non-section 96 court, that of the Recorder, sitting with the jurisdiction of a 
Court of Sessons, enjoyed a comprehensive indictable offence jurisdiction except for 
specific offences restricted to a superior court of criminal jurisdiction when punishable 
by death; (ii) in Ontario, trial by jury was available only before a court with a section 96 
element — either a superior court of criminal jurisdiction or the Sessions chaired by a 
County Court judge; and (iii) in Quebec, trial by jury was legally possible before a Ses­
sions composed of justices.
41 Art Act respecting the prompt and summary administration o f  Criminal Justice in certain cases, C.S.C. 1859, c. 
105, ss 1,4,16,30,31.
42An Act to abolish the right o f Courts o f Quarter Sessions and Recorders’ Courts to try Treasons and Capital 
Felonies, S.C. 1861, c.14, s.l.
*3An Act respecting Offences against the Person, C.S.C. 1859, c.91, ss 5,19,20,22; An Act respecting Offences 
against Person and Property, C.S.C. 1859, c.92, ss 1,8; An Act respecting Arson and other malicious injuries to 
property, C.S.C. 1859, c.93, ss 1,7,8.
44 An Act for abolishing the punishment o f death in certain cases, S.C. 1865, c.13, s .l.
